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Abstract
Guided fuzzing has, in recent years, been able to uncover many new vulnera-
bilities in real-world software due to its fast input mutation strategies guided
by path-coverage. However, most fuzzers are unable to achieve high coverage in
deeper parts of programs. Moreover, fuzzers heavily rely on the diversity of the
seed inputs, often manually provided, to be able to produce meaningful results.
In this paper, we present Wildfire, a novel open-source compositional fuzzing
framework. Wildfire finds vulnerabilities by fuzzing isolated functions in a C-
program and, then, using targeted symbolic execution it determines the fea-
sibility of exploitation for these vulnerabilities. Based on our evaluation of 23
open-source programs (nearly 1 million LOC), we show that Wildfire, as a result
of the increased coverage, finds more true-positives than baseline symbolic exe-
cution and fuzzing tools, as well as state-of-the-art coverage-guided tools, in only
10% of the analysis time taken by them. Additionally, Wildfire finds many other
potential vulnerabilities whose feasibility can be determined compositionally to
confirm if they are false-positives. Wildfire could also reproduce almost all (15
out of 16) of the known vulnerabilities and found several previously-unknown
vulnerabilities in three open-source libraries.
Keywords: Vulnerability analysis, Source-code coverage, Fuzzing, Symbolic
execution, Compositional analysis
1. Introduction
Fuzzing and symbolic execution are the two most popular techniques for
automatically generating test-cases and finding vulnerabilities that have had
a significant impact in the form of data and economic loss [53]. Fuzzing, in
particular, has recently been very successful [32, 45, 4] in revealing exploitable
vulnerabilities in open-source and widely used software, that exposed them to
severe security-related implications, such as buffer-overflows. Fuzzing tools,
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such as AFL [57] and Peach [5], employ mutation strategies that rapidly change
the user-supplied seed-inputs based on some heuristics. With appropriate in-
strumentation and fast mutation of inputs, the fuzzer may trigger interesting
parts in the code where improper input handling may lead to a program crash,
hang, or other undesirable behaviours. Most of the vulnerabilities found by
fuzzers, however, are located in parts of the code that are relatively easy to
reach [23, 36] for randomly mutated input data. The more complex parts of the
program, which are guarded by branching conditions that cannot be satisfied
by most random mutations are not reached, and hence not sufficiently explored,
by the state-of-the-art fuzzers.
On the whitebox analysis side, symbolic execution [26], and their practical
approaches such as concolic execution [43, 12] and whitebox fuzzing [24], suffer
from the well-known path-explosion problem [11] due to which execution gets
stuck in the shallow branches. Compositional analysis has been proposed in the
past [40, 7] as a technique to alleviate the path-explosion problem in symbolic
execution. It analyzes individual components that make up a larger system
and, then, prunes away those paths in the program that do not lead to inter-
esting executions of those components, such as vulnerability triggers. Results
show [16, 34] that compositional analysis is trivially able to cover more parts
of the program than plain symbolic execution and also, indeed, discovers more
vulnerabilities in programs.
Fuzzing has not been, to the best of our knowledge, considered as a viable
option for compositional analysis yet. We aim to bridge this research gap in this
paper. The goal of our work is to improve vulnerability detection capability of
fuzzers through increasing coverage in isolated functions. We define isolated
functions as those functions that are parameterized, i.e. g(int a) can be iso-
lated but not g(void). Our central premise is that, as shown by previous works
[34, 23], higher coverage in isolated functions leads to an increase in discovered
vulnerabilities as well. Then, our methodology employs targeted symbolic ex-
ecution to perform a reachability analysis for the vulnerabilities discovered by
fuzzing, so that we may confirm which vulnerabilities can also be exploited from
higher level calling contexts.
Problem. Even though state-of-the-art fuzzers are capable of effectively finding
vulnerabilities in programs that accept input from files or standard input, the
line coverage achieved by these fuzzers is insufficient. In particular, as shown
by previous studies [36], the coverage of functions lying deeper in the call-graph
of the program is very low for fuzzers. As a result, these fuzzers miss many
vulnerabilities in deep-lying parts of programs.
Solution. Drawing inspiration from past works in the improvement of plain
symbolic execution [16, 21], we present a compositional analysis approach for
fuzzing large real-world programs. We, first of all, fuzz isolated functions using
automatically generated seed-inputs. In this step, functions at all depths of
the program’s call-graph can be covered. Next, the framework summarises
the vulnerabilities found by the fuzzer in isolated functions and replaces the
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respective functions by their summaries. Finally, we use targeted symbolic
execution to determine whether the vulnerabilities in isolated functions can be
triggered by their parent (calling) functions, with the process repeated till a
top-level function, such as main, is reached. This way, we can determine to a
high degree of confidence whether a vulnerability in an isolated function may
be a false-positive because the calling arguments are sanitised in the parent
functions.
Contribution. In this paper, we have made the following main contributions
1. We describe a novel compositional fuzzing technique for finding vulnera-
bilities in programs using a combination of fuzzing and targeted symbolic
execution.
2. The design of fuzzing drivers, described in section 4, can automatically
generate seed inputs for any previously-unknown program, even if the
goal may be to apply a fuzzer without compositional analysis.
3. The design and implementation of the framework can effectively make use
of parallel cores, making it more scalable and efficient to find vulnerabil-
ities in large-scale programs, than state-of-the-art fuzzers and symbolic
execution engines.
4. Our evaluation of various open-source programs demonstrates that Wild-
fire can find more vulnerabilities than symbolic execution and fuzzing,
through higher coverage in less time. Secondly, using three case studies,
we show that compositional fuzzing can reproduce almost all exploitable
vulnerabilities in open-source libraries and find new ones.
5. The accompanying tool, Wildfire1, implements the techniques described in
this paper for C-programs, and is the first of its kind in hybrid (involving
fuzzing and symbolic execution) compositional analysis tools. We have
released Wildfire as an open-source tool.
We start this paper by briefly introducing the background to our methodol-
ogy in section 2. Then, using a real-world example of a program, we motivate
the problem-statement in section 3. Our methodology is, then, described in
section 4 followed by some implementation details in section 5. In section 6,
we evaluate Wildfire based on three research questions and list some limitations
in section 7. We list some related work to our research of symbolic execution,
fuzzing and compositional analysis, in section 8. Finally, in section 9, we con-
clude the paper.
1Wildfire or, more precisely, Macke-with-Wildfire-mode can be downloaded for free at
https://github.com/tum-i22/macke
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2. Background
Before describing our compositional analysis approach we, first, describe the
essential background of the underlying techniques of our methodology – fuzzing
and targeted symbolic execution.
2.1. Fuzzing
Fuzzing is an automated testing technique [49, 52] that makes use of muta-
tions2 of seed inputs to execute the program under test and observe the return
values and the external state of the system. It is known as a blackbox tech-
nique because it does not rely on information about the internal structure of
the program but employs mutation strategies that change individual or groups
of bits in the seed inputs to discover new paths in the program. The advantage
fuzzing has over whitebox analysis techniques is that, due to the fast mutation
strategies that do not depend on solving path-constraints, fuzzing can generate
quickly invalid data to trigger vulnerabilities in programs, thereby causing un-
wanted behaviour, such as program crash. As a result, fuzzers can find many
real vulnerabilities [32, 50, 8] in programs that may be missed by other means
of analysis.
2.2. Targeted Symbolic Execution
Symbolic execution [26] is a whitebox automated testing technique that col-
lects path-constraints along a program path from an entry point (e.g. main func-
tion) to an exit point (e.g. return statement) and solves these constraints using
a constraint solver (e.g. SMT solver) to generate concrete test-cases that execute
the respective path. Most symbolic execution engines, such as KLEE [12] and
Mayhem [13], employ a path-exploration strategy that prioritises unseen paths
in the program. However, in many cases, inputs need to be generated that
will trigger specific functionality or known areas of interest in a program, such
as payload processing [23] or patches [31] that may potentially break existing
functionality. In these cases, the symbolic execution engine needs to prioritise
those paths that lead to the target of interest instead of new paths only. Various
techniques [29, 34, 54] have been suggested in the past for effectively focussing
symbolic execution towards interesting areas of code. In addition to finding
inputs for reaching targets of interest, targeted symbolic execution also helps
in reducing the path-explosion problem, that is one of the main bottlenecks for
classical symbolic execution techniques.
2In this paper, we only refer to the mutation-based fuzzing techniques, such as [57] and [8]
as fuzzers, and not include in this terminology generation-based fuzzers such as [19], [23] and
[25]. This distinction will be clarified further in section 8
4
main uncompress uncompressStream BZ2_bzRead
BZ2_bzDecompressBZ2_decompressBZ2_hbCreateDecodeTables
=> Covered by KLEE=> Covered by AFL
Figure 1: Pruned call graph of Bzip2-1.0.6. A possible path from main to a
vulnerable function, BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables, is shown here
3. Motivation
Having described the background of fuzzing and symbolic execution we will
now motivate our problem statement by referring to a vulnerability in a com-
monly used UNIX tool, Bzip2 3. Bzip2 is a UNIX tool for compressing and
decompressing files using a block-sorting compression algorithm, accompanied
by an API (Libbzip2 ) that developers may use in their programs. The existence
of such an API indicates a need for extensive testing of the library, because there
may be many potential entry points to the library, not only the main function,
resulting in a large attack surface.
Listing 1: Code of the function BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables
1 void BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables ( Int32 ∗ l im i t ,
2 Int32 ∗base , Int32 ∗perm , UChar ∗ length ,
3 Int32 minLen , Int32 maxLen , Int32 a lphaS ize )
4 {
5 Int32 pp , i , j , vec ;
6
7 pp = 0 ;
8 for ( i = minLen ; i <= maxLen ; i++)
9 for ( j = 0 ; j < a lphaS i ze ; j++)
10 /∗ po t en t i a l bu f fer−overf low here ∗/
11 i f ( l ength [ j ] == i ) { perm [ pp ] = j ; pp++; } ;
12
13 /∗ . . .
14 ∗ some more process ing omitted here ∗/
15 }
Listing 1 shows a condensed version of the code of Bz2 hbCreateDecodeTables
function of Bzip2, that has a potential vulnerability in line 11. Basically, if the
value of parameter, alphaSize, is bigger than the size of the buffer, length, an
attacker can cause a buffer-overflow on line 11 (j ≥ sizeof(length)) resulting
in a program crash, i.e. denial-of-service. One possible sequence of function
calls that can lead to BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables is shown in figure 1. One
would expect there to be a check on the alphaSize variable (whether it is less
than the size of length) in at least one of the functions between main and
BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables. However, upon inspecting the code of all these
3www.bzip2.org
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functions, we discovered that such a check simply does not exist, i.e. the vul-
nerability in line 11 can be exploited from main4. One would hope that popular
test-case generation methods of fuzzing or symbolic execution would generate
at least one test-case to exploit it.
We ran KLEE [12] (with default path-search strategy) and AFL [57] (with
7 unique compressed files, as seed input) on Bzip2 for 10 hours, each. To
make the path exploration more focused for discovering our target function of
BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables, we supplied the “-d” flag, which forces decompres-
sion (calling the uncompress function) without necessarily performing expensive
initialization.
We found that neither KLEE nor AFL was able to spot the vulnerability
in BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables function. While AFL covered all the functions
from main to BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables, KLEE covers up to the function
BZ2 decompress. However, even though the vulnerable instruction was covered
by AFL in 10 hours, none of the two tools were able to trigger the vulnerability
itself, i.e. cause a program crash resulting due to buffer-overflow.
The above demonstrates the limitation of fuzzing and symbolic execution
tools in achieving reasonable path coverage in programs that take as input files
or data-structures encoded in a particular format, such as block-sorted files. Be-
cause of potentially complex branching-conditions in the BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables
function, AFL cannot mutate our seed inputs to generate the correct file headers
to exploit the vulnerability in this function. Symbolic execution, on the other
hand, also had to deal with path-explosion in the BZ2 decompress function,
and could never cross them to reach BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables. In this pa-
per, we describe a method to force coverage of almost all functions in programs
like Bzip2, while also being able to determine whether potential vulnerabilities,
such as the one in BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables, can be exploited.
4. Compositional Fuzzing – Methodology
We will now describe the design of our compositional fuzzing framework,
Wildfire, and its components.
4.1. Overview
The technical design of our framework, Wildfire, is shown in figure 2. In this
figure, the steps of our framework and their inputs and outputs are shown in
white boxes, which we will discuss first. The specific tools and implementation
details to assist in various tasks are shown in grey/black boxes and boxed-arrows
that we will discuss in section 5.
The multi-threaded workflow of Wildfire, depicted in figure 3, consists of the
following steps, in order:
4This vulnerability has already been reported to, and acknowledged by, secteam at FreeBSD
project and the author of Bzip2. We are currently awaiting analysis for a CVE.
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Figure 2: Technical design of Wildfire
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Figure 3: Workflow of Wildfire
1. Instrumentation and compilation of the source-code to LLVM intermediate
representation.
2. Generating fuzzing drivers to populate seed-inputs for isolated functions
and to extract function arguments from the inputs generated by the fuzzer.
3. Generating test-cases with fuzzing of the drivers generated in the previous
step, for isolated functions.
4. Generating crash reports by replaying the test-cases generated by a fuzzer
on an instrumented version of the program and reporting vulnerabilities.
5. Summarizing functions and replacing the isolated functions with exploit
test-cases, thereby condensing functions to only the paths leading to po-
tential vulnerabilities.
6. Determining feasibility of discovered vulnerabilities using stack-trace match-
ing and targeted symbolic execution to recursively generate, until an entry-
point is reached, concrete arguments to trigger the vulnerabilities.
We now describe all but the first steps in more detail below. The first step is
a trivial compilation procedure for LLVM. However, the description of compiled
objects, as shown in figure 2, will be presented in section 5.
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4.2. Generating Fuzzing Drivers
To fuzz isolated functions in a program, Wildfire needs to generate fuzzing
drivers that act as wrappers around these functions, to 1. given the parameter
list, generate seed-inputs (known, from now on, as seed-arguments) for the func-
tion, and 2. correctly assign the inputs generated by the fuzzer to the function
arguments. We will now describe the design of driver generation w.r.t. both
requirements listed above.
4.2.1. Seed-argument Generation
Various possibilities, such as thresholded symbolic execution [38, 36] and
taint analysis [19, 55] have been proposed to generate seed-inputs for fuzzing.
However, while they may be useful for programs containing many parsing func-
tions, the overhead of symbolic execution is too high for our approach where we
directly fuzz isolated functions. We prefer to generate seed-arguments statically,
i.e. without executing the function first. We propose two methods to generate
seed-arguments for isolated functions. In the first method, Wildfire generates
two byte-streams – an empty stream and a stream consisting of random char-
acters from the English alphabet, [a − z]. Providing a random character is
important because we cannot fuzz a target if all the seed-inputs lead to a pro-
gram crash or hang (due to the limitation imposed by our fuzzer, as discussed
in section 5). For a parameter of pointer type, a function is more likely to crash
due to buffer-overflow with an empty byte-stream than with a non-empty one.
In the second method for generating seed-arguments, Wildfire generates a byte-
stream with as many delimiter characters in the seed-argument byte-stream as
there are parameters for the function. As we will see in section 4.2.2, the delim-
iter character determines the start and end within a byte-stream between which
an argument must be extracted.
4.2.2. Argument Extraction
void foo ( int a , int b )
x x x // x x x x
Byte-stream
(seed-input or 
generated by 
the fuzzer)
void bar ( int *a  ,                 int b )
Discarded (do nothing)
Delimiter Discarded (do nothing)
Figure 4: How function arguments are extracted from a byte-stream.
The input provided by the fuzzer, including seed-arguments, is a byte-
stream. We need to extract bytes from this byte-stream (and cast, if necessary)
and assign to function arguments. Two example scenarios for argument extrac-
tion from a byte-stream are shown in figure 4. Our method, first and foremost,
distinguishes function parameters as one of two types - non-pointer and pointer
data-type. We will ignore any functions with parameters with double- or more
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pointers. This is a limitation in our framework, and we will discuss this further
in section 7.
The first scenario depicted in figure 4 is that of a function foo that ac-
cepts two non-pointer type (integer) arguments. In algorithm 1, we show the
algorithm for extracting non-pointer type arguments, such as int or char. The
ExtractFixedSizedArgument function simply copies typeSize number of bytes
(line 4 in algorithm 1) from the byte-stream to the argument and casts it to the
required type. If there are not at-least typeSize number of bytes left in the
stream to consume, the stream is padded with null character bytes, as shown
in lines 8 and 9. The next scenario depicted in figure 4 is that of a func-
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for extracting non-pointer arguments
1: procedure ExtractFixedSizedArgument(int typeSize, char[] remData, int remSize)
2: type [] t
3: if typeSize ≤ remSize then
4: t← type(remData[: typeSize])
5: remData← remData[typeSize :]
6: remSize← remSize− typeSize
7: else
8: memset(t,′ \0′, typeSize)
9: t[0 : remSize]← remData
10: remData← [ ]
11: remSize← 0
12: end if
13: return type(t), remData, remSize
14: end procedure
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for extracting pointer arguments
1: procedure ExtractDynamicSizedArgument(int typeSize, char[] remData, int remSize)
2: type [] t, int bufSize, int givenSize
3: givenSize← LookForDelimiter(remData, remSize)
4: bufSize← RoundDown(givenSize, typeSize)
5: t← remData[: bufSize]
6: if (bufSize ≤ remSize) then
7: remSize← remSize− givenSize
8: remData← remData[givenSize :]
9: else
10: remData← []
11: remSize← 0
12: end if
13: return t, remData, remSize
14: end procedure
tion bar that accepts one pointer type (integer pointer) and one non-pointer
type argument. For parameters of pointer type, our approach is based on a
special delimiter character (assumed to be “//” in figure 4) in the byte-stream
that splits it for assigning to dynamically-sized parameter types. As shown in
algorithm 2, for each pointer type argument, ExtractDynamicSizedArgument
copies the input byte-stream to t (line 5) till the first delimiter character is
encountered, or the end of byte-stream has been reached. The helper function,
LookForDelimiter (line 3) returns the location of the first delimiter character
in the leftover byte-stream, or the end of the stream, whichever comes first.
RoundDown rounds givenSize down to a multiple of typeSize.
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For the motivating example in section 3, this step will generate drivers
for fuzzing the functions main, uncompress, uncompressStream, BZ2 bzRead,
BZ2 bzDecompress, BZ2 decompress, BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables and all other
functions in the Bzip2 program.
4.3. Generating Test-cases using Parallel Fuzzing
After generating fuzzing drivers, the next step in our framework is to apply
the fuzzer to the isolated functions with the generated seed-arguments. The
inputs to fuzzing are the generated drivers (implying, directly, the function)
which, as described in section 4.2, can be directly executed by the fuzzer. This
step can be run in parallel for all isolated functions because the calling contexts
of the isolated functions are ignored for now.
For all isolated functions, the output of this step is a list, Tf , of all test-cases
generated by the fuzzer for function, f .
Tf = {t1, t2, . . . tn}, (1)
where n is the number of unique test-cases generated by the fuzzer. If the
function f accepts m arguments, then,
ti = 〈Ii1 , Ii2 , . . . Iim〉, (2)
where Iik is the k
th argument.
For the motivating example in section 3, this step applies the fuzzer to the
function BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables and saves the list of arguments, limit,
base, perm, length, minLen, maxLen, alphaSize (listing 1), generated by the
fuzzer. An instance of test-case generated for BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables is
shown in figure 5.
Àÿ// //_ // // 0  0  21
*limit *base *perm *length minLen maxLen alphaSize
Figure 5: Example of a test-case (byte-stream) generated by the fuzzer for
BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables.
In this example, the delimiter, “//” splits the first part of the generated
test-case into the pointers limit, base, perm and length. The later part of the
test-case is three integers minLen, maxLen and alphaSize.
4.4. Generating Crash Reports using Test-cases Replay
Fuzzing of isolated functions is carried out on a lightweight compiled object,
without heavy instrumentation. Therefore, to obtain crash-reports that include
the function’s arguments and the stack-trace of crashing executions, we must
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obtain details of all crashing (due to discovered vulnerabilities) executions to be
passed to the next steps. To do this, the first step is to minimize the set of all
generated test-cases, using afl-cmin [1] and afl-tmin [3]. These two programs
reduce the size of an input corpus by 1. removing inputs that execute redundant
paths in the program, and 2. removing starting and trailing null bytes from an
input byte-stream while keeping the executed path unchanged.
Then, we pass the minimised set of test-cases to an instrumented version of
the compiled object that gracefully handles crashing executions due to buffer-
overflows, illegal pointer operations or null-pointer dereferencing. The input to
this step, as shown in figure 2, are the test-cases generated by the fuzzer in
section 4.3. The first output of this step is the list, T ′f , of all test-cases (argu-
ments) that result in a program crash. The second output of this step is a set of
stack-traces for crashes reported in the isolated functions. A stack-trace, Sf0 ,
of a crashing execution of the function, f0, with arguments, ti (equation (1)), is
an ordered set
Sf0(ti) = 〈L(f0), L(f1), L(f2) . . . L(fn)〉, (3)
where fi calls fi+1. Here, L returns the vulnerable instruction (line number)
and name of the function.
We call all buffer-overflows, null-pointer dereferences and other index-out-of-
bounds memory operations reported in the crashing function as vulnerabilities
and an isolated function that contains at least one vulnerability as a vulnerable
function.
For the motivating example in section 3, this step would generate the stack-
trace for a crash found in BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables as shown in figure 6. We
Stack:
#000000147 in BZ2_hbCreateDecodeTables at bzip2-1.0.6/huffman.c:183
#100000322 in __user_main 
#300000685 in macke_BZ2_hbCreateDecodeTables_main
Figure 6: Stack-trace generated by ASAN for a crash due to a vulnerability
discovered in BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables.
see the top element in the stack-trace is the location of the discovered vulnera-
bility (line number and function name). The next two lines in the stack are the
location of the artificial entry-points inserted by our framework to generate a
test-driver for BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables.
4.5. Summarizing Vulnerable Functions
After generating crash reports for vulnerable functions, Wildfire replaces
the isolated functions with a summary of the crash reports, to allow targeted
symbolic execution for some of them. The rationale behind this step is to
tackle the path-explosion problem in symbolic execution. To assist the symbolic
execution engine in not getting stuck due to path-explosion, we replace the set
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of paths in a vulnerable function by just the set of value-assignments for its
arguments that will trigger the vulnerabilities.
Let, for a vulnerable function f0, the parameter list be P .
P = 〈p1, p2, . . . pm〉, (4)
where pi is the i
th formal parameter for f0. Then, the summary, fsummary,
generated for the f0 is as shown in algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Summary of a vulnerable function, f
1: function fsummary(P)
2: assert(P 6= t1)
3: assert(P 6= t2)
4:
.
.
.
5: assert(P 6= tn)
6: return f(P )
7: end function
In algorithm 3, ti is as described by equation (2). Intuitively, the function
summaries simply compare the formal parameters with actual argument values
that were found to trigger a vulnerability. For pointer data-types, this entails
comparing the exact content of the allocated memory using memcmp. We assert a
negation of equality because, then, Wildfire reports an assertion error (and stops
further processing) when there is a match found for P that is equal to ti. Such
an assertion error implies that the vulnerability in f can, indeed, be triggered
from a calling function of f . If there is no assertion-error (calling function
cannot generate crashing inputs), we proceed with the processing by calling the
original function f , as intended, to ensure that we include its side effects on
the function and its variables. Please note that, unlike previous work, such as
[40, 30], where formal parameters are compared to the input pre-conditions (in
the form of constraint systems), our technique only matches the concrete values
of the arguments, because we are limited by the fuzzer, which only generates
concrete inputs and not general path-constraints.
For the motivating example in section 3, let us consider again the vulner-
able function BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables. The control-flow graph (CFG) of
this function (extraced from the LLVM bitcode using Opt [6]) is shown on the
left-hand side of figure 7. We can see from the original CFG that symbolic
execution will encounter path-explosion in this function due to the many input-
dependant loops in original function. On the right-hand side of figure 7, we see
the summarized version of the same function with no loops, because we have
replaced the original body with assertion statements described above. In this
way, symbolic execution is more likely to generate test-cases that trigger the
discovered vulnerability in BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables.
4.6. Determining Feasibility of Reported Vulnerabilities
After finding and reporting potential vulnerabilities in isolated functions, any
compositional analysis framework needs to determine whether these vulnerabil-
ities can be exploited in a real usage of the program, e.g. through a program’s
12
CFG for 'BZ2_hbCreateDecodeTables' function
%0
%9
T F
%13 %43
%14
T F
%44
T F
%18
T F
%39
%27
%35
%40
%36
%47 %55
%52
%56
T F
%60 %76
%73
%77
T F
%80 %96
%93
%97
T F
%100 %108
%105
%110
T F
%114 %140
%137
%143
T F
%147 %169
%166
CFG for '__macke_error_BZ2_hbCreateDecodeTables' function
%0
def 1 2 3 4 5
%2
%3
T F
%629
T F
%3095
T F
%3565
T F
%6031
T F
%34
T F
%628
%660
T F
%3094
%3126
T F
%3564
%3596
T F
%6030
%6062
T F
%8448%627 %3093 %3563 %6029 %8447
Figure 7: CFG of the original BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables (left) and the trans-
formed CFG of the summarized BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTablessummarized.
API. This determination of exploitation can be done pairwise for functions, i.e.
can a vulnerability in function f be exploited from functions that call f and,
if yes, can it exploited from the functions that call the functions that call f ,
and so on till an interface function is reached. Wildfire performs the above
determination in two phases, which we will now describe.
4.6.1. Phase 1: Stack-trace Matching
As explained in section 4.4, the crash reports generated by the instrumented
version of the program contain stack-traces of crashing executions of isolated
functions. Our framework, in this phase, determines that a vulnerability in fa
can be exploited by fb if there were at least two matching stack-traces, Sfa
and Sfb . We call two stack-traces, Sfa and Sfb , matching [34] if Sfa ⊂O Sfb .
Here ⊂O denotes an ordered subset, meaning that the elements in the smaller
set occur in the same sequence as in the larger set. Intuitively, this phase of
feasibility determination checks if a crashing execution of a function, fb, is due
to the same vulnerable instruction as another crashing execution of function fa
that will, potentially, be called by fb.
For the motivating example in section 3, we have shown an example of
stack-trace matching in figure 8. The top functions (above user main) in the
call-stack of BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables is a subset of that of BZ2 decompress.
We can see from this example that the stack-trace of a crashing execution of
the caller function BZ2 decompress matches the stack-trace of the crashing ex-
ecution of the callee function BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables.
4.6.2. Phase 2: Targeted Symbolic Execution
A pair of matching stack-traces, Sfa and Sfb , in phase 1 implies that fuzzing
was able to cover the path in fb that leads to the vulnerable function, fa, with
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Stack:
#000000147 in BZ2_hbCreateDecodeTables at bzip2-1.0.6/huffman.c:183
#100000322 in __user_main 
#300000685 in macke_BZ2_hbCreateDecodeTables_main
Stack:
#000000163 in BZ2_hbCreateDecodeTables at bzip2-1.0.6/huffman.c:183
        #200000629 in BZ2_decompress at bzip2-1.0.6/decompress.c:339
#100000322 in __user_main 
#300001081 in macke_BZ2_decompress_main
Figure 8: The stack-trace of crashing execution of BZ2 decompress (bottom,
after removing intialization code) matches the stack-trace of crashing exe-
cution of BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables (top).
arguments triggering the vulnerability. However, if no such matching stack-trace
can be found for Sfa , it might be because the fuzzer was not able to generate any
test-cases to trigger the said path, and not merely because such a path does not
exist. In phase 2, Wildfire tries to exploit the vulnerable functions from calling
functions using symbolic execution to target only those vulnerable functions for
which no matching stack-traces were found in phase 1.
Phase 2 of feasibility determination takes as input the function summaries,
fsummary, generated in section 4.5. After replacing the function bodies with
their summaries, we use targeted symbolic execution from parent functions to
find paths leading to a vulnerable function. Consider again a vulnerable func-
tion fa, for which phase 1 did not find any matching stack-trace. In phase
2, all functions, fb, that potentially call fa are symbolically executed by our
framework where the target is set as fasummary , which is the summarized ver-
sion of fa. When a targeted search strategy is applied, all those branches are
ignored (based on distance in the control-flow graph) that do not potentially
lead to the target. In contrast to the explore-new-paths-first [12] strategy, which
is commonly the default in symbolic execution engines, a targeted symbolic ex-
ecution is less likely to get stuck due to path-explosion because it eliminates
uninteresting paths as soon as it can determine that they would never lead to
the target. Additionally, the function summary fasummary also has fewer paths
to explore than the original function, fa. In this phase, therefore, we increase
our chances of determining if a vulnerability found in fa can also be exploited
from functions, fb, that potentially call fa.
For the motivating example in section 3, we see in figure 9 the stack-trace
of crashing execution of BZ2 bzDecompress. In this example, BZ2 decompress
Stack:
        #000007459 in __macke_error_BZ2_decompress
#100005877 in BZ2_bzDecompress at bzip2-1.0.6/bzlib.c:842
#100000322 in __user_main 
#400794644 in macke_BZ2_bzDecompress_main 
Figure 9: The stack-trace of crashing execution showing BZ2 bzDecompress
calling the summarized version of BZ2 decompress, when executed with tar-
geted symbolic execution.
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was, first, summarized using the technique described in section 4.5 and, then,
the calling function BZ2 bzDecompress was analyzed with targeted symbolic
execution to determine the feasibility of the discovered vulnerability. We see
in figure 9 that the vulnerable function BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables is not in
the stack-trace because, with function summaries, we no longer need to ver-
ify the entire path from BZ2 bzDecompress to BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables to
determine that the vulnerability can be exploited.
Wildfire applies both, phase 1 and phase 2, recursively until the main func-
tion or a library’s API functions are reached. The output of this stage is a list of
vulnerability reports, each containing the vulnerable instruction, function and
the chain of functions through which it is feasible to exploit it.
5. Implementation
We have implemented Wildfire as an extension to Macke [34], which is our
existing compositional analysis tool for C programs. The original implementa-
tion of Macke, described and released in 2016, utilized the source-code of the
analyzed program to perform several compositional analysis steps, including
targeted symbolic execution. However, in its current form, we have introduced
several enhancements, in addition to compositional fuzzing, that make Macke
more portable and precise, by utilizing a program’s LLVM bitcode for all com-
positional analysis steps. Below we describe some implementation details for
Wildfire and, wherever applicable, list differences from the original Macke [34].
Different LLVM Versions. It was necessary for our framework to compile the
program-under-test to two target objects, LLVM 3.4 and 6.0 [27] bitcodes. This
was because the choice of our fuzzing and symbolic execution tools could only
accept LLVM 6.0 and LLVM 3.4 bitcodes, respectively. Moreover, to insert
dynamic instrumentation, we could only use intermediate LLVM representations
and not binaries.
AFL for Fuzzing. For fuzzing isolated functions, we use AFL [57], which is a
state-of-the-art fuzzing tool for binaries and LLVM. We make use of the deferred
instrumentation mode in AFL [2] that lets us dynamically dictate to the fuzzer
that the driver selection (which functions to fuzz), should be skipped and only
the original function body must be fuzzed.
ASAN for Generating Crash Reports. Using Opt, we insert ASAN [46] instru-
mentation into LLVM 6.0 bitcode. The test-cases generated by AFL are sent
as inputs to this ASAN instrumented version of the program to obtain crash
reports caused by illegal memory-related operations, such as buffer-overflows or
use-after-free, as described in section 4.4.
KLEE22 for Symbolic Execution. Our choice of symbolic execution tool for
determining the feasibility of vulnerabilities is KLEE22 [37]. KLEE22 is a cus-
tom fork of KLEE [12], which implements targeted-search based on arbitrary
function-calls in a program.
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6. Evaluation
We will now describe the experiments, metrics, results and, finally, a syn-
thesis of our observations.
6.1. Comparison Baseline
We start the description of our experiments by listing the tools that we will
compare with Wildfire. There exist many competing frameworks and tools, such
as Driller [48], AFLGo [9], FairFuzz [28] and Angora [15] , that have proposed
many improvements over state-of-the-art mutation-based fuzzing. However, we
picked our baseline tools mainly based on whether a tool 1. was available as
an open-source tool, 2. had reasonably complex user-guide or documentation,
and could be used “out-of-the-box” for our analysed programs, and 3. promised
a higher coverage or higher rate of vulnerability-discovery for general-purpose
UNIX-based programs, compared to other techniques.
With the above inclusion criteria in sight, we concretely divide the state-of-
the-art, and comparative, tools in the following three categories.
1. Basic tools: The first set of tools that we will compare with are basic
symbolic execution and fuzzing tools. For symbolic execution, we will
pick KLEE [12] and for fuzzing, we will pick AFL [57]. Both of these
tools are considered state-of-the-art in the fundamental techniques used
in this paper.
2. Coverage-guided tools: Next, we include more sophisticated tools in-
volving symbolic execution and fuzzing, that improve upon these fun-
damental techniques by actively monitoring structural coverage of the
program-under-test. We will pick AFLFast [8] and Munch [36] in this
category. More details on these tools can be found in section 8.
3. Compositional tool: Finally, we include Macke [34], which is the only
other compositional analysis tool, to the best of our knowledge, which is
open-source and available out-of-the-box for C-language programs. We
must mention here, for the sake of full disclosure, that Macke and Wild-
fire are based on the same underlying technologies, as described in sec-
tion 5. But they differ, specifically, in how vulnerabilities are discovered
in isolated components (section 4.3), arguments are extracted from byte-
streams (section 4.2.2), test-cases are replayed (section 4.4) and functions
are summarized in terms of discovered vulnerabilities (section 4.5).
6.2. Research Questions
To evaluate Wildfire, we will try to answer the following research questions
RQ1 How does the in-depth coverage of analysed programs by Wildfire compare
to those of the basic and coverage-guided tools?
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RQ2 Following from coverage, how does the vulnerability finding capability of
Wildfire compare to those of the basic, compositional and coverage-guided
tools?
RQ3 Can Wildfire be used to effectively test libraries without manual interven-
tion, such as writing drivers?
6.3. Experimental Setup
For answering the research questions, we selected 8 open-source C programs
and 12 GNU Binutils (only Unix-specific ones), listed in table 1, for RQ1 and
RQ2. In terms of LOC and functions, this set contains a wide range from basic
utilities to much larger programs. For answering RQ3, we selected three case
Table 1: Open-source programs analyzed
Prog.# Program LOC Functions Analysis time (minutes)
Wildfire and
Macke [34]
Other tools
1 bc 1.06 3.5k 129 22.5 283.2
2 bzip2 1.0.6 3.3k 108 36.4 383.3
3 diff 3.4 7.8k 391 103.0 849.9
4 flex 2.6.0 6.5k 260 58.0 716.6
5 grep 2.25 8.0k 461 130.5 933.3
6 less 481 7.9k 459 66.7 800.1
7 lz4 r131 4.7k 205 68.6 999.9
8 sed 4.2.2 3.2k 213 57.9 349.9
Binutils
2.31.1
9 addr2line 49.0k 1485 607.0 1440.2
10 ar 50.2k 1547 605.0 1584.0
11 as 65.8k 2088 603.2 1584.1
12 cxxfilt 48.9k 1484 274.3 1584.0
13 gprof 51.2k 1540 404.4 1439.9
14 ld 64.3k 1953 510.2 1440.3
15 nm 49.5k 1509 383.4 1440.3
16 objcopy 56.2k 1656 187.1 1584.1
17 objdump 64.5k 1876 234.2 1584.0
18 ranlib 50.3k 1547 394.0 1440.3
19 readelf 17.5k 249 42.9 514.8
20 size 49.1k 1491 380.5 1439.9
Libraries
21 Libtiff 4.0.9 82.7k 639 368.0 –
22 Libpng
1.6.35
43.8k 516 360.0 –
23 Libcurl
7.59.0
209.2k 692 680.0 –
studies (table 1) of open-source libraries.
We repeated all experiments five times5 on an Intel Xeon CPU E5-1650 v2
5Due to reasonably limited resources and long experiment times (≈ 13 hours per repetition
per benchmark, per tool) we could not perform more than 5 repetitions.
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with 12 cores, 3.50GHz per core, 126 GB of RAM, and running 64-bit Ubuntu
16.04.4 LTS.
In each repetition, we allowed Wildfire to fuzz each isolated function for 60
seconds each (maximum) and we gave each run of targeted-search a total of
60 seconds to reach the vulnerable function and trigger the vulnerability. For
comparison, we ran Macke [34] for the same amount of time as Wildfire. Gen-
eration of test-cases for functions could be carried out in parallel (section 4.3)
for isolated functions in Wildfire and Macke, i.e. all 12 cores could be utilised at
the same time. Therefore, for a fair comparison, we allowed the other baseline
tools, KLEE [12], AFL [57], AFLFast [8] and Munch [36], to run for approx-
imately 12 times the total time taken by Wildfire or 24 hours, whichever was
smaller. We recognize that for many programs, especially Binutils, the cap of
24 hours is significantly less than a supposedly fair 12 times of the time taken
by Wildfire and Macke. We justify the choice of limiting the experiment times
for the baseline tools to 24 hours as follows
1. However, 24 hours is a reasonably long time budget for most real-world
programs (and is also used by state-of-the-art fuzzing research papers,
such as [48], [8] and [28]), and is longer than the usual nightly build times.
2. Having run (without repetition) KLEE, AFL, AFLFast and Munch on the
“as” program for 12 times the time taken by Wildfire, i.e. 7238.4 min-
utes, we found that the coverage (line and function) and vulnerabilities
discovered by these tools did not increase. While the same verification
w.r.t. coverage and vulnerabilities would not have been feasible for all the
benchmarked programs, with or without repetition, we may use the anec-
dotal example of as as an indication that 24 hours might be a sufficiently
high time budget for most programs.
Times taken in each repetition of every benchmarked program are listed in
table 1.
6.4. Coverage and Vulnerabilities
For evaluating coverage, we compare Wildfire to the basic and coverage-
guided tools. For evaluating vulnerabilities, we compare Wildfire to basic,
coverage-guided and compositional tools.
Figure 10 shows the average (over 5 repetitions) line-coverage (%) achieved
by Wildfire, KLEE, AFL, AFLFast and Munch in the given time-limits. Fig-
ure 11 shows the average (over 5 repetitions) function-coverage (%) achieved
by the same techniques. Figure 12 shows the average (over all functions and 5
repetitions) line-coverage at every depth of the call-graph of all programs, e.g.
the lines of code in the main function are counted at x = 0 in figure 12, and
so on. Please note that at every call-graph depth, we only averaged over those
programs that contained at least one function at that depth.
Figures 10 to 12 show that the in-depth line coverage and function cover-
age for all programs is larger with Wildfire than plain symbolic execution and
fuzzing, as implemented in KLEE and AFL, respectively, as well as advanced
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Figure 12: Comparison of line coverage grouped by call-graph depth
tools that improve upon these techniques based on coverage, viz. AFLFast and
Munch. We see from these results that the line coverage for bc and Binutils
is not as high (22% and 16%, respectively) as other programs with Wildfire.
The reason for this discrepancy is that these programs, especially Binutils, have
a few very large functions in terms of lines of code that could not be covered
sufficiently by fuzzing. However, as is the case with all the programs, the line
coverage in these programs is also higher for Wildfire than with the basic and
coverage-guided tools. Wildfire even achieves higher coverage at depth = 0 due
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to the following reason – more lines in the main function are covered when tar-
geted symbolic execution is used for determining feasibility of vulnerabilities,
than when only fuzzing or symbolic execution is applied without a set target.
The reason that function coverage was not 100% for Wildfire was, as explained
in section 4.2.2, that Wildfire does not fuzz functions that contain any param-
eter of double- or more pointer type. In this study, we take no measures to
handle this case and, instead, rely on targeted symbolic execution in phase 2
(section 4.6) to generate test-cases for those functions that could not be fuzzed
by AFL.
Table 2: Vulnerability-related metrics for Wildfire and the compositional
tool
Prog. Vulnerabilities |chain| > 1 chain ≺ P2
Wildfire Macke Wildfire Macke Wildfire Macke
bc 72 57 42 30 7 16
bzip2 96 71 33 22 0 0
diff 219 256 205 166 32 7
flex 124 106 46 40 3 12
grep 319 261 186 132 24 7
less 167 166 151 124 15 14
lz4 102 92 119 100 43 3
sed 124 93 109 86 37 8
addr2line 979 804 404 226 10 9
ar 983 794 386 234 10 8
as 1230 1051 586 355 24 10
cxxfilt 895 811 294 234 4 6
gprof 982 837 398 238 9 6
ld 1218 1005 522 326 15 13
nm 948 847 362 247 10 7
objcopy 862 0 221 0 0 0
objdump 1008 0 258 0 0 0
ranlib 944 850 360 242 9 7
readelf 159 106 62 50 11 0
size 948 791 375 216 9 9
strings 1106 0 550 0 10 0
strip 872 0 221 0 0 0
An increased coverage can be easily explained because we directly fuzz iso-
lated functions. In fact, simply increasing line or function coverage would be
insufficient if the increased coverage also did not increase the vulnerability dis-
covery capability of a dynamic analysis method, such as fuzzing. And the goal
of our evaluation is precisely to show this – does increased line coverage result in
an increased likelihood of covering a potentially vulnerable line in the program.
Let us now see how increased line coverage affects vulnerability discovery.
Table 2 lists the results related to vulnerability discovery for Wildfire and the
only other compositional analysis tool in our study, Macke [34]. For these two
tools, we have listed in this table the following three measures – The column
“Vulnerabilities” lists the total number of vulnerabilities found by these tools,
determined by a uniquely vulnerable instruction (equation (3)). To determine
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whether any calling function could exploit the vulnerabilities discovered by
Wildfire or Macke, we list the “|chain| > 1” criteria, listed in the next col-
umn, that counts only those vulnerabilities that can be, according to feasibility
analysis (section 4.6), exploited by at least one calling function. Some of these
chains were reported by simple stack-trace matching, as described in phase 1 of
feasibility determination (section 4.6), while others were reported from targeted
symbolic execution towards summarised functions in phase 2. The number of
such chains whose ends (highest-level vulnerable functions) were reported by
phase 2, and not by simple stack-trace matching, are listed in the next column
in table 2 as “chain ≺ P2”6.
We can see from table 2 that Wildfire was almost always (except diff ) able to
find more vulnerabilities than Macke. Moreover, the number of chains discovered
by Wildfire with |chain| > 1 was also more than with Macke. Lastly, for most
programs, Wildfire discovered as many, or more, chains of vulnerabilities with
chain ≺ P2. From table 2, we can see that Wildfire performs better than, or
the same as, Macke on most metrics described for compositional analysis tools.
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Figure 13: Distribution of vulnerability-chains’ lengths across all programs.
72% of the vulnerabilities that could be exploited from main() required
targeted symbolic execution to be found
The total distribution of the lengths of chains of functions where a unique
vulnerable instruction may be exploited, as per Wildfire, is shown in figure 13a.
This distribution shows that Wildfire can generate chains of various lengths and,
in fact, finds that about half of all discovered vulnerabilities can be exploited
by at least one other function. In some cases, chains of 6 or more functions in
the call-graph are also found. For 72% of all chains ending at the main func-
tion, targeted symbolic execution was necessary to trigger the vulnerabilities.
Additionally, while the average length of all chains reported by Wildfire is ≈ 1.6
(figure 13a), it is ≈ 2.6 (figure 13b) for chains where chain ≺ P2. The above
demonstrates the usefulness of combining targeted symbolic execution with iso-
lated functions’ fuzzing for discovering high-impact vulnerabilities.
However, some of the vulnerabilities discovered by Wildfire or Macke may
never be exploited because their calling functions might sanitise the inputs be-
fore calling the vulnerable functions. Therefore, as a final comparison with
state-of-the-art tools, we present in table 3 the count of vulnerabilities that
6“chain ≺ P2” should be read as “chains ending with a function found by phase-2 of
feasibility analysis.”
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could be triggered from the main function of a program. Since this factor can
be measured for any baseline tool of our study, we have included basic tools
(KLEE and AFL), coverage-guided tools (AFLFast and Munch), and composi-
tional tool (Macke) for comparison.
Table 3: Vulnerability-related metrics for all baseline tools
Prog. main vulnerabilities
Wildfire KLEE [12] AFL [57] AFLFast [8] Munch [36] Macke [34]
bc 3 0 1 1 0 5
bzip2 0 0 0 0 0 0
diff 2 0 0 0 0 2
flex 0 0 1 1 1 0
grep 0 0 0 0 0 0
less 1 1 0 0 0 1
lz4 1 1 0 0 1 2
sed 1 0 0 0 0 1
addr2line 1 0 0 0 0 1
ar 0 0 0 0 0 0
as 7 0 0 0 0 6
cxxfilt 0 0 0 0 0 0
gprof 0 0 0 0 0 0
ld 3 3 1 1 2 3
nm 2 1 0 0 1 2
objcopy 0 0 0 0 0 0
objdump 0 0 0 0 0 0
ranlib 0 0 0 0 0 0
readelf 0 0 0 0 0 0
size 1 0 0 0 0 1
Total 22 6 3 3 5 24
We can see from table 3 that for all but one (Flex will be explained later)
programs, the number of such vulnerabilities found by Wildfire was higher than
or equal to other baseline tools, in almost 90% less time (considering paral-
lelism). However, for bc and lz4, Macke outperformed Wildfire and found 2 and
1 more vulnerability from main function, respectively.
In terms of its effectiveness in finding vulnerabilities that can be exploited
from main function, we see that Macke (symbolically executing isolated func-
tions) was able to find two more vulnerabilities in the analyzed programs than
Wildfire. At first glance, it may seem that Wildfire reports more false-positives
(comparing values from table 2 and table 3) than Macke. However, in reality,
there are two justifications for why the true-positives listed in table 3 should
not be the sole criterion for comparison –
1. Many of the vulnerabilities found in isolated functions by Wildfire may not
be found to be feasible from main due to path-explosion in the higher-level
functions. An example of this is the vulnerable function BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables
discussed in the motivating example (section 3). This vulnerability was
found by Wildfire in the given time limit, and the reported chain of vulner-
ability contained functions BZ2 bzDecompress and BZ2 decompress, but
not main. However, as discussed earlier (section 3), this vulnerability can
indeed be exploited by a specially crafted file with dishonest parameter
for the length of the compressed file block. The above demonstrates that,
for a true comparison of the effectiveness between compositional tools,
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we must consider all, total number of reported vulnerabilities, chain of
reported vulnerabilities and reported true-positives.
2. Functions may be reused in unforeseable ways in the future and, therefore,
vulnerabilities discovered in them need to be compositionally analyzed,
irrespective of whether they were found to be exploitable through main.
We will elaborate both the above points further in section 6.6.
Please also note that all the numbers in table 2 and table 3 are the common
results from the five repetitions of Wildfire, KLEE, AFL, AFLFast, Munch and
Macke, i.e. we only list those vulnerabilities and chains that were reported by
all five runs of the respective method.
The Flex exception. We saw in table 3 that AFL, AFLFast and Munch discov-
ered more main vulnerabilities in Flex than Wildfire. In the code of Flex, the
majority of the functionality is contained within a function that lie close to the
main function, viz. flex main function. Due to this fact, Wildfire should have
given more time to this large function than other smaller functions, because the
baseline tools get much more overall time to analyze this single function close
to the entry point than Wildfire. We leave time-scaling based on the size of
isolated-functions as future work.
Thus, we have shown, using 20 benchmarks, that a compositional fuzzing ap-
proach makes it more likely to discover vulnerabilities in a considerably shorter
time than basic and coverage-guided tools, by deliberately executing functions
in isolation, and performing a bottom-up feasibility analysis.
6.5. Real Vulnerabilities in the Wild
In section 6.4, we have shown how Wildfire outperforms state-of-the-art tech-
niques on programs that have a single user-interface, i.e. main function. We will
now show that Wildfire can also find vulnerabilities in open-source libraries that
have many possible entry points, i.e. APIs, that increase their attack surface.
Unlike fuzzing and symbolic execution, Wildfire can analyze these libraries au-
tomatically, without the need for manually writing API drivers.
To demonstrate that Wildfire can effectively be used to test libraries without
writing test-drivers, such as is the case with baseline tools, viz. AFL, KLEE,
AFLFast and Munch, we picked three popular open-source libraries, listed below.
1. Libtiff 4.0.9 7 – A library used by application developers to process images
of TIFF, and a few other, formats.
2. Libpng 1.6.35 8 – A library used by application developers to process PNG
images.
7http://www.simplesystems.org/libtiff/
8https://libpng.sourceforge.io/
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3. Libcurl 7.59.0 9 – A library for transferring data using various secure and
non-secure transfer protocols.
Our goal with these case studies was to find out if we can reproduce the vulner-
abilities reported in the past for them and if we can find any new ones.
For finding vulnerabilities, we filtered the list of all reported vulnerabilities
(by Wildfire) to those where there was at least one API function in the chain
of vulnerability. Table 4 lists all previously known vulnerable functions in the
respective versions of Libtiff, Libpng and Libcurl. We obtained this list from
Table 4: Known Vulnerabilities in Libtiff 4.0.9, Libpng 1.6.35 and Libcurl
7.59.0
Function CVE Found by Wildfire
TIFFSetupStrips CVE-2017-17095 !
PackBitsEncode CVE-2017-17942 !
TIFFPrintDirectory CVE-2017-18013 !
TIFFSetDirectory CVE-2018-5784 !
TIFFPrintDirectory CVE-2018-7456 !
LZWDecodeCompat CVE-2018-8905 !
TIFFWriteDirectorySec CVE-2018-10963 !
png set text 2 CVE-2016-10087 !
png set PLTE CVE-2015-8126 !
png get PLTE CVE-2015-8126 !
png do expand palette CVE-2013-6954 !
png free data CVE-2018-14048 !
Curl http readwrite
headers
CVE-2018-1000301 !
Curl smtp escape eob CVE-2018-0500 !
Curl auth create ntlm
type3 message
CVE-2019-3822 %
Curl pp readresp CVE-2018-1000300 !
NVD10 and then filtered them by the name of the library and the corresponding
latest version. The second column of table 4 lists the known CVE identifier for
the respective vulnerabilities. The last column shows whether Wildfire could
find the same vulnerability in the given time-out. As we can see from table 4, all
the known vulnerabilities in Libtiff and Libpng, and all but one vulnerabilities
in Libcurl, could be found by Wildfire under the given time-limit.
We also found 23 new vulnerabilities in these three libraries that could be
exploited through at-least one function in the respective libraries’ API. Table 5
lists the previously unknown vulnerabilities (of type “buffer errors”) in Libtiff,
Libpng and Libcurl that can be exploited by an improper (but valid) use of
their APIs.
9https://curl.haxx.se/
10https://nvd.nist.gov/
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Table 5: New Vulnerabilities Discovered in Libtiff 4.0.9, Libpng 1.6.35 and
Libcurl 7.59.0
Vulnerable Function Affected API
TIFFFindField TIFFGetFieldDefaulted
unixErrorHandler TIFFFdOpen
TIFFRGBAImageOK TIFFReadRGBAImage
TIFFSwabArrayOfShort TIFFSwabArrayOfShort
TIFFSwabArrayOfLong TIFFSwabArrayOfShort
TIFFWriteBufferSetup TIFFWriteTile
png set filler png set add alpha
png warning png set compression method
png colorspace set chromaticities png set cHRM
png error png set compression buffer size
png set keep unknown chunks png image skip unused chunks
png icc check header png set iCCP
png rtran ok png set alpha mode
png get y pixels per meter png get y pixels per inch
png get y offset microns png get y offset inches
curl easy cleanup curl easy cleanup
curl easy perform curl easy perform
curl getdate curl getdate
curl mime init curl mime init
curl slist append curl slist append
curl slist free all curl slist free all
curl easy escape curl easy escape
curl easy unescape curl easy unescape
6.6. Synthesis of the Results
6.6.1. RQ1– Coverage
Several works in the past [34, 48, 23] have shown that the primary reason
that state-of-the-art test-case generation techniques are unable to find many
vulnerabilities is a lack of coverage in deeper parts of the code, often guarded
by complex checks for malformed inputs. We, therefore, hypothesised that
forcing higher coverage in programs would also lead to discovering previously
unknown vulnerabilities. Compared to dynamic analysis techniques of symbolic
execution and fuzzing, we showed in section 6.4 that Wildfire achieves higher
line- and function-coverage. The reason for higher in-depth coverage was merely
the under-constrained nature of the fuzzing stage, where isolated functions were
analyzed directly. Symbolic execution and fuzzing tools could not cover as much
of the source-code or functions because they had to overcome complex frontier
nodes [38] to execute these functions.
RQ1 – Our results show that, for the selected benchmarks, Wildfire achieves
higher in-depth line coverage and function coverage than basic and coverage-
guided baseline tools.
6.6.2. RQ2– Vulnerabilities
Our second research question was whether, as a result of higher coverage,
Wildfire could also find more vulnerabilities in programs than the compari-
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son baseline. Our conjecture was based on several previous works [16, 21, 34]
that use symbolic execution at the level of isolated functions and found more
vulnerabilities and increased coverage. In section 6.4, we found that, in fact,
the number of vulnerabilities (including potential false-positives, as we will dis-
cuss soon) reported by Wildfire is always higher than state-of-the-art symbolic
execution and fuzzing tools and, for most programs, is higher than the state-
of-the-art compositional tool. Additionally, the number of vulnerabilities that
could be exploited from the main function is also the same or higher for basic
and coverage-guided tools.
Importantly, a compositional fuzzing framework can also help reduce the
problems of false-positives, as follows. In particular, not all reported vulnerabil-
ities that cannot be triggered from an interface, such as the main function, are
false-positives. We provide three reasons for this claim here. 1. If a vulnerability
can be shown to be exploitable through multiple caller-callee pairs (|chain| > 1),
then it could potentially be true-positive and, hence, should be fixed. Anecdotal
evidence of this is our observation on the motivating example of Bzip2 (sec-
tion 3). The vulnerability in BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables was reported by Wild-
fire by, first, analyzing the isolated functions (section 4.4) and, then, determin-
ing feasibility of the vulnerabilities through compositional analysis (section 4.6).
The reported chain, BZ2 bzDecompress→ BZ2 decompress→ BZ2 hbCreateDecodeTables,
with |chain| > 1, should indicate that the vulnerability should be fixed, even if
the framework could not reproduce the feasible path from main function. Man-
ually confirming all reported vulnerabilities with |chain| > 1 was not feasible
in our work, but sorting vulnerabilities by |chain| should be the first step in
bug-triage. A combination with targeted symbolic execution allows Wildfire
also to report more chains (chain ≺ P2 in table 2) than from simply fuzzing
the isolated functions and examining their stack-traces. Without targeted sym-
bolic execution, as discussed in section 6.4, we would not have been able to
find many critical vulnerabilities, some of which were reproducible through the
top-level interface. 2. There may be many other factors [18], such as the degree
of connectedness of a function [33] and the distance to an interface such as main
function [35], that affect if a vulnerability may be exploited, even if an exploit
from main could not be generated. 3. In practice, functions tend to be reused
in unforeseen contexts and, hence, it may be advisable to fix vulnerabilities
directly inside functions that may be reused.
RQ2 – Our results show that, for all but one selected benchmarks, Wildfire
finds more vulnerabilities than basic, coverage-guided and compositional
baseline tools. It also finds more, or the same number of, true-positives
as the basic and coverage-guided tools and the two less true-positives than
the compositional tool.
6.6.3. RQ3– Testing Libraries
Our final research question was whether Wildfire could help in effectively
testing libraries to find vulnerabilities, without the time-consuming process of
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writing drivers. By applying our framework to three popular open-source li-
braries, Libtiff, Libpng and Libcurl, we showed in section 6.5 that almost all of
the known vulnerabilities, could have been found by Wildfire. We were also able
to find new vulnerabilities and report them to their development teams. This
is a key contribution of our research because open-source libraries with public
APIs are often used as daemon or microservices on remote servers accepting
input through standard protocols, such as HTTP. If a malicious user was to
send malformed input to the API to trigger the discovered vulnerabilities, they
could cause a denial-of-service resulting in a substantial monetary and functional
loss. Our motivation was to show that a compositional analysis framework, un-
like non-compositional ones, such as AFL, KLEE and AFLFast, is necessary
to trigger vulnerabilities in libraries, without writing specialized test-drivers.
Wildfire, by reporting all chains of potential vulnerabilities directly affecting
the API functions, would discover and help in mitigating these vulnerabilities
at the earliest. For the vulnerabilities that could not be confirmed to be feasi-
ble from the API, i.e. potential false-positives, we argue for them in the same
manner as earlier, viz. with reports containing chains of vulnerable functions, it
makes it easier for developers and testers to triage the reported bugs.
RQ3 – Our results show that, for the selected open-source libraries, Wild-
fire can effectively find vulnerabilities in them without writing specialised
drivers for automatically testing them.
7. Limitations
Pointer Analysis. Currently, support for a few kinds of pointers in Wildfire is
insufficient. Particularly, if a function parameter list contains at least one pa-
rameter of double- or more pointers (such as array-of-arrays), then the function
will not be isolated and fuzzed. The same is true if there is at least one pa-
rameter of function-pointer type. In case of pointers to structures which may,
themselves, contain members of pointer data-types, Wildfire attempts to allo-
cate memory for them (using malloc) and extract values for them from the
function arguments, as described in section 4.2.2. However, if there are no
explicit checks on pointers inside structures, then a crash resulting from their
access will be, correctly, reported.
Global Variables. Another limitation of Wildfire is that it does not take into
account, and hence fuzz, the values of global variables that might affect the
internal states of isolated functions. However, as is also true for past works in
compositional analysis [16, 22, 34], when including all possible global variables
in the argument extraction procedure, the search space for possible executions
explodes intractably.
Due to the above reasons, and possibly more, our results may not gener-
alise to other kinds of C programs that may functionally or structurally differ
from our evaluation set. However, we have taken care to, firstly, not exclude
any programs by design in our study and, secondly, include programs varying
27
from medium- to large-scale, in terms of the number of high-level source-code
lines and functions. We applied these selection criteria to, both, open-source
programs with a main entry point and open-source libraries that are popularly
used by many third-party applications.
Programming Language. The final limitation that needs to be noted is related
to the programming language that our analysis method is restricted to, i.e. C.
Even though the underlying fuzzing and targeted symbolic execution engines
can function at the intermediate level of LLVM, we are limited by the symbolic
model for several system and third-party libraries for programming languages
other than C. Due to this reason, Wildfire can only be used for programs written
in C language. However, the fundamental higher-level ideas described in this
paper may be implemented for other programming languages too.
8. Related Work
8.1. Fuzzing tools and advancements
Fuzzing [49] is a blackbox or greybox strategy, often guided by lightweight
instrumentation [57], to generate test-cases for a program. Libfuzzer [47] is
a fuzzing tool for libraries and arbitrary functions using an in-process and
coverage-guided fuzzing algorithm based on AFL [57]. However, due to the
in-process nature of Libfuzzer where the fuzzing logic is executed for each it-
eration in the same process as the target application, Libfuzzer cannot recover
automatically after finding a crashing input. Due to the above, Libfuzzer was
not a suitable choice of fuzzing tool in Wildfire, because it would be too ex-
pensive to restart the fuzzer process for every crashing execution in isolated
functions. Several state-of-the-art fuzzers such as AFLFast [8], Honggfuzz [51],
Peach [5], and Vuzzer [41] have been developed in the past decade alone that
have specialized optimizations in terms of directed path search [9], guided seed
selection [42] and controlled frequency of path selection [14, 56]. Many of these
advanced fuzzers have also found several previously unknown vulnerabilities [8].
Please note that we do not include generative fuzzing techniques under the
terminology of fuzzing because, unlike mutation-based methods, most genera-
tive techniques employ methods such as symbolic execution [23], existing in-
put grammars [19] and parsers for exising models [25]. Due to their reliance
on underlying solvers, such as SMT, generative fuzzing techniques also suffer
from the constraint solving problems associated with symbolic execution. For
demonstrating the effectiveness of the techniques in our paper, therefore, we
have differentiated between solver based techniques (symbolic execution) and
mutation-based techniques (sometimes guided by coverage).
8.2. Compositional Analysis
To handle the issues of path-explosion and constraint-solving in symbolic
execution [11], several approaches have been proposed of which compositional
analysis [34, 16, 44, 22, 39] is one. Breaking down a larger program into smaller
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modules has shown to improve [21, 44, 30, 54] the structural coverage of symbolic
execution engines, as expected. With the compositional analysis of discovered
vulnerabilities (using targeted symbolic execution [29]), some techniques [17,
16, 34] can also report the extent to which the calling functions are affected.
Comparison with Macke. The only open-source compositional analysis tool avail-
able for comparison was Macke [34]. Since it forms the basis of Wildfire too,
below we have listed the difference in our contribution over Macke.
1. The original implementation of Macke did not include any support for
fuzzing isolated function and, therefore, this is an entirely novel addition.
2. The original implementation of Macke required re-compilation for every
isolated function before it could be analyzed with symbolic execution. We
enhanced it in the current version (including Wildfire mode) by allowing
to dynamically insert entry-points in the compiled LLVM bitcode, for every
isolated function. This enhancement saves compilation time and disk space
by not storing multiple compiled objects for the same program.
3. Support for generating crash reports from ASAN is a novel contribution
because the original Macke did not support fuzzing or gracefully han-
dling crashing test-cases generated by AFL. Additionally, we also modi-
fied Macke to convert ASAN crash reports to a compatible format that
could be read and analyzed by KLEE22. This modification is also useful
because Macke can, in future, be modified to include any mode of dynamic
analysis, such that if the test-cases can be used by ASAN for generating
crash reports, the tool can perform compositional analysis.
4. KLEE22 contains a complete rehaul of the targeted symbolic execution
technique described in the original Macke implementation [34]. In its
earlier version, KLEE22 used a distance metric based only on the lines of
source-code in a function between its entry-point and the call instruction
to the vulnerable function. However, in the current version (including
Wildfire mode), KLEE22 calculates distances based on instructions in
the entire LLVM bitcode of the program, inline functions, and return
addresses of called functions on the stack. Due to these enhancements,
the targeted symbolic execution in current Macke version is more precise
than the earlier version.
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no past work to explore fuzzing,
instead of symbolic execution or static analysis [20], as a possible strategy for
finding vulnerabilities in isolated functions. In addition to extensive evaluation
of compositional analysis, such a fuzzing-based compositional analysis technique
is our main contribution.
8.3. Hybrid Fuzzing and Symbolic Execution
Driller [48] is a hybrid tool that employs selective symbolic execution to help
the fuzzer overcome saturation w.r.t. new paths discovered. It was able to dis-
cover many previously unknown vulnerabilities and performed especially well on
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the Darpa Cyber Grand Challenge dataset. Taintscope [55] and BuzzFuzz[19]
employed dynamic taint tracking, to focus fuzzing on interesting byte-regions
of input that may affect suspicious regions of the code. Bo¨ttinger and Eckert
[10] presented DeepFuzz, a tool that finds vulnerabilities in binaries by using
symbolic execution to estimate the probability of exploring new paths with a
seed mutation during fuzzing. Munch [36] is a hybrid tool introduced to in-
crease function coverage by employing two combinations of symbolic execution
and fuzzing – fuzzing with seed-inputs generated by symbolic execution, and
targeted symbolic execution when fuzzing saturates. Finally, Pak [38] presented
a hybrid method to feed the fuzzers with inputs generated by symbolic execution
by solving the path-constraints after a new branch has been visited. As men-
tioned before, none of these hybrid works analyzes isolated components, but only
applied at the single entry-point of programs. An alternative to our hybrid and
compositional approach would have been to use state-of-the-art methods such
as symbolic execution to find vulnerabilities in isolated components, just like
Macke [34], and confirm the feasibility of vulnerabilities by biasing a mutation-
based fuzzer, as done in AFLGo [9], towards generating inputs to execute the
target vulnerabilities. This is an orthogonal approach to our technique and,
therefore, will not be discussed in this paper.
There are, to the best of our knowledge, no previous solutions based on
compositional analysis to overcome the known difficulties of fuzzing (insufficient
path-coverage) and symbolic execution (path-explosion and constraint solving).
Wildfire plugs this gap in hybrid research.
9. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented Wildfire, an open-source compositional analysis
framework based on a novel combination of fuzzing and symbolic execution.
Wildfire can find more real, and potentially exploitable, vulnerabilities in open-
source programs and libraries than state-of-the-art fuzzing, symbolic execution,
in only 10% as much time in most cases, accounting for parallelisation of anal-
ysis. Compared to the only other compositional analysis tool at our disposal,
Wildfire was able to find more vulnerabilities and almost the same number of
true-positives in the same amount of time, also taking into account paralleli-
sation. Wildfire deals with false-positives by precisely reporting the chains of
functions through which a vulnerability can be exploited. This can be, as shown
by our case studies, particularly useful and practical for testing libraries where
there may be multiple entry-points to a program. In the future, we would like
to implement summarisation of vulnerabilities by path-constraints rather than
concrete argument values. We also wish to extend Wildfire by combining with
symbolic execution to adaptively switch between the two techniques when one
saturates in isolated functions. By using heuristics from existing bug reports, we
would, in the future, include an automated bug-triage plugin for vulnerabilities
discovered by Wildfire.
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